Sans dec … : http://bzhits.fr/

Jusque là, Google fait son boulot :

bzhits dans Google

Les vrais-faux chinois, yahoo et les script-kiddies aussi :

Logs bzhits

Une plus trois !

Comme annoncé le 16 mars, les derniers-nés de Lostihuel on fait leur sortie ce matin dans le salon transformé en bloc obstétrique vétérinaire. Bref, le miracle de la vie a encore opéré et nous avons récupéré 3 adorables chatons sous les yeux éberlués de Paul&Ju qui bien qu’ils connaissaient déjà toutes les astuces de la conception chez les mammifères n’avaient pas envisagé un spectacle aussi extraordinaire de « révélation » !

-« Allez, pousse Louloute … »

-« Pouarrrr… mais c’est dégueux, elle lui machouille le cordon ombilical … « 

Un blanc, un gris et un tigré. 3615 qui n’en veut ? Car dans deux mois faudra leur avoir trouvé une famille d’accueil !

LM Googling 20130129

Finalement, ça me plait assez ! C’est ma tronche sur le trombi de l’EN qui ressort le plus souvent. J’aime aussi assez ma photo de classe de troisième (suis entre Mireille Pillault et Tatane Grolleau), celles prises à l’Ecole Navale pendant le GPEN 2011 et attablé à La Frégate à Belle-Ile .

AFP 13/05/2011 | Mise à jour : 17:11

Le vice-premier ministre russe, Sergueï Ivanov, a annoncé vendredi que Moscou avait changé l’équipe de négociateurs russes chargés de l’achat de deux navires de guerre français de type Mistral, sur fond de pourparlers difficiles.

« De notre côté, la délégation chargée des négociations est dirigée par Rosoboronexport », l’entreprise publique russe chargée des exportations d’armements, a déclaré M. Ivanov à des journalistes qui l’interrogeaient sur le changement d’équipe, selon l’agence Interfax.

Une source militaire russe avait indiqué la semaine dernière que l’équipe de négociateurs russes avait changé après le limogeage de l’adjoint au commandant de la Marine, le vice-amiral Nikolaï Borissov, et la nomination du vice-ministre de la Défense, Vladimir Popovkine, à la tête de l’Agence spatiale russe.

Les négociations achoppent sur les transferts de technologie, avant tout le système de combat Zenith 9 et le système de commandement SIC-21, selon une source militaro-diplomatique citée par l’agence Interfax.

Ces difficultés pourraient repousser à l’année prochaine la signature du contrat évalué par Moscou à au moins 1,5 milliard d’euros, qui a fait l’objet d’un accord politique entre les deux pays, selon la même source.

La Russie achètera deux Mistral à condition que la France accepte de transférer les technologies du Zenith 9, a averti au début du mois une source du complexe militaro-industriel russe.

Fin janvier, la France et la Russie ont signé à Saint-Nazaire (ouest de la France) un accord très controversé qui prévoit la fabrication de quatre navires de type Mistral pour la marine russe. Deux bâtiments doivent être construits essentiellement en France et deux en Russie.

La fourniture à Moscou d’un tel navire est une première pour un pays de l’Alliance atlantique. Elle a suscité les critiques de Washington et des pays baltes, membres de l’Otan comme la France, ainsi que de la Géorgie.

Apart from the ongoing battle between Russia’s top brass and defense industry, the top military story has been the developing crisis over the planned purchase of two Mistral helicopter carriers from France.

It turns out that both sides have a different understanding of which technologies should be included in the deal and of the overall price tag. Russia insists that the Mistral ships come equipped with all of the advanced control systems for which they wanted the ships in the first place. Contrary to popular belief, the Navy is primarily interested in the Mistral’s capabilities as a command center and not its modest forced-projection potential.

But the French military and defense industry are wary about transferring the ship’s critical SIC-21 command and control system. Moreover, Russia wants to buy the two Mistrals with all of the “extras” for 980 million euros ($1.45 billion), whereas France calculates the price for the deal at 1.15 billion euros.

These disagreements brought negotiations to a standstill in early April, and both sides are now working to restart them. Meanwhile, one senior Russian official has already become a casualty. President Dmitry Medvedev has sacked Navy Vice Admiral Nikolai Borisov, supposedly for agreeing to the 1.15 billion euro price tag without first obtaining authorization from the top.

What is the root cause of this crisis?

As usual, both sides have contributed to the problem. Russia has not yet built up experience in purchasing big-ticket foreign military equipment for import. Despite the popular notion that Russia is planning to re-equip its military with foreign weapons systems, the reality is that such imports total less than $100 million per year. By contrast, Russia exported $10 billion in arms in 2010, with another $16 billion in equipment purchased for domestic use. What’s more, the lion’s share of those so-called “imports” are actually systems and components that foreign clients wanted installed in Russian equipment for export, meaning that they were never intended for domestic use.

Without experience in foreign procurement deals, Russia also lacks the necessary legislation and history of cooperation between the relevant institutions. This has resulted in a less than perfect level of cooperation between the Russian military; Rosoboronexport, the country’s weapons export and import monopoly; and the defense industry.

In addition, there are powerful opponents to the deal on the Russian side, especially the domestic shipbuilding industry and its patron, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin. In summer 2008, Sechin halted the ill-advised purchase of the dilapidated and unfinished Ukrainian cruiser Ukraine for 20 billion rubles (more than $670 million). The influence of the gray eminence has declined since then, but it remains strong enough to stop the Mistral purchase in one way or another. Political opponents to Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and his reforms have also used the disagreements over the Mistral to boost their cause.

Although building up a balanced Russian fleet does require landing docks and aircraft carriers, owning a helicopter carrier is not a vital necessity. More urgent is the need for corvette and frigate class ships as well as latest generation non-nuclear submarines. Therefore, the Mistral purchase should not be a top priority.

According to one popular theory, Russia ordered the Mistral ships not so much to augment its Navy but as a gesture to thank France and President Nicolas Sarkozy for the French stance during the Russia-Georgia war in 2008. At that time, the shipyard in Saint-Nazaire had almost no clients. A possible Russian order was important for the French shipbuilding industry and for the political reputation of Sarkozy. But the situation has changed significantly since then. The economic picture at the Saint-Nazaire shipyard is not as dire as it was in 2008, and the French can now allow themselves to take a firmer position with regard to the transfer of sensitive technologies.

In addition, Russia and France are approaching new electoral cycles, and both presidents have some chance of winning re-election. Accordingly, whatever political or personal agreements they made in the past are gradually losing force.

Finally, Russia’s sudden tougher stance on the deal could be because of Moscow’s dissatisfaction over Sarkozy’s involvement in the Libyan operation in which France, the top instigator of the Libyan operation, and other Western militaries have gone far beyond the mandate of the United Nations Security Council that limited military operations to achieve two goals only: to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya and protect its civilians. In that context, Moscow’s decision to backtrack on the Mistral purchase could send a signal to Paris that the special relationship between the two countries could suffer if things get too much out of hand in the Western coalition’s campaign against Libya.

For its part, in the past several years French arms exporters have shown an unmatched ability to torpedo arms deals at the very last moment. They demonstrated this brilliantly during attempts to sell Rafale fighter jets to Morocco, Brazil and the United Arab Emirates — countries that have traditionally purchased French arms and that maintain excellent political, military and industrial ties with Paris.

In the first half of the last decade, French military exports peaked at between $6 billion and $7 billion per year, but have now fallen to below $4 billion annually. That is lower than both Russia and tiny Israel, a country that does not produce military aircraft and ships. In fact, market participants note that French arms are unusually expensive, that the French exhibit arrogance and petty greed in dealing with clients and that France does a poor job of supplying after-sales service for the equipment it sells, a problem often attributed to Russian arms exporters as well.

For all of these reasons, Russia’s largest foreign arms purchase is under threat of being annulled. Time is working against the Mistral deal, and the chances of signing a final contract are becoming increasingly elusive.

Ce qui  m’étonnera toujours c’est la possibilité de lire tout et son contraire sur internet: d’un côté l’appel au secours style « Il faut sauver le contrat Mistral » et de l’autre le rassurant  » Mistral: Paris livrera les navires dûment équipés « . Faut-il y voir le syndrome des Rafale brésiliens ou lybiens ou alors espérer un happy end à la sauce « Scorpene Indien ». Bien clairvoyant celui qui connait l’issue !

En attendant la venue de Medvedev au sommet du G20 en mai, je reproduis les 2 articles de la presse russe.

12.04.2011 RusNavy.com

Negotiations on the Mistral contract is deadlocked because of non-favorable configuration of the ships and numerous blunders made by Russian party, reports Vedomosti referring to a presidential spokesman and a defense ministry’s officer.

According to the newspaper, ship configuration unfavorable for Russia was agreed upon in the very beginning of negotiations; delivery of communication aids and control systems is not provided either. Besides, according to the tentative agreement, the contract does not include construction of third and fourth ships in Russia, crew training, and technology transfer.

The only solution for this problem can be found at the summit level, reports Vedomosti. Supposedly, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev would meet with his French counterpart during the G20 Summit to be held in May 2011 in France.

According to the joint statement made by Russian and French presidents in Dec 2010, Russia will purchase two Mistral class assault landing ships in France and construct other two at domestic yards under French license. Preliminary talks were held by Russian defense ministry; then it agreed with Rosoboronexport which represents Russia in negotiations since 2011.

All blunders were made at preliminary stage, say sources of Vedomosti. As for the presidential spokesman, the protocol signed last year by Russian Navy’s director for armaments Vice Admiral Nikolai Borisov in the presence of Vice Premier Igor Sechin provided the sum of EUR 890 mln which does not include charges for technology transfer and shipborne control systems. This would cost Russia another EUR 200 mln, says the source.

Vice Admiral N. Borisov was dismissed by presidential decree late in March. Russia’s leadership consider current Deputy Defense Minister for Armaments Vladimir Popovkin also responsible for blunders in negotiations; he may also leave his office, said the official.

MOSCOU, 13 avril – RIA Novosti – Parole d’un officiel russe

Moscou a réussi à persuader la partie française de lui livrer les porte-hélicoptères français de type Mistral avec tous les systèmes et les dispositifs nécessaires, a annoncé mercredi à RIA Novosti une source haut placée au ministère russe de la Défense.

« Lors des négociations bilatérales passées, nous avons convenu que la partie française tiendrait compte des exigences du Ministère de la Défense en matière d’équipement des navires à l’aide de systèmes et de dispositifs répondant aux normes de la Marine russe », a indiqué l’interlocuteur de l’agence.

Auparavant, certains médias russes avaient annoncé que les négociations étaient dans l’impasse, la partie française refusant de fournir les systèmes de communication et de commandement.

« Les préparatifs de l’achat par la Fédération de Russie des bâtiments de projection et de commandement (BPC) de type Mistral progressent de façon régulière dans le cadre de négociations avec la partie française », a affirmé le haut responsable militaire.

Il a souligné que le contrat négocié sur l’achat par la Russie de porte-hélicoptères Mistral prévoyait la livraison de deux navires de ce type, de pièces de rechange, des instruments et de la documentation technique.

« Ledit contrat prévoit la livraison de matériel et la prestation de services permettant la construction en Russie de deux navires Mistral, ainsi que l’octroi au client (le ministère russe de la Défense) du droit de se servir de la documentation de travail », a ajouté l’interlocuteur de l’agence.

The import contract of two French Mistral class assault landing ships is being prepared up to the schedule, although such high-level deal cannot be closed at an early date, reports Rosoboronexport.

« This is a long, very long process », reported Interfax-AVN referring to Anatoly Isaikin, director general of FSUE Rosoboronexport.

He reminded the state contract signed between Rosoboronexport and Russian defense ministry provides procurement of two Mistrals.

Commenting reports that the Russian-French shipbuilding contract would be allegedly signed on March 15, 2011, Isaikin said: « Dates are conjectures. When hundreds of millions are at stake, such contracts need years of negotiations. It is ridiculous to expect that we would close such contract within several months ».

Anatoly Isaikin.

Speaking about details of the negotiation process, the head of Rosoboronexport particularly pointed out that the orderer – Russian defense ministry – should « first of all thoroughly determine specifications, and what exactly French partners are ready to transfer ».

As for him, this is the job of technical experts. The case has a legal side as well. Different countries have different legislation systems which not always match each other. « We’re inching towards the compromise in some matters and seek for some options. It is a careful and continuous work. Talks on the contract cost is a separate issue also needing time to reach mutually acceptable solutions », said Isaikin.

In particular, one should consider « dozens of items » while discussing the price. « Of course, the customer – in this particular case it is Russia – always wants to know how much each item costs and the general price pattern. We debate over every item one by one », Isaikin said.

As was previously reported, on Dec 24, 2010 Russia and France agreed about construction of two Mistral class assault landing ships in Saint-Nazaire (France), and other two – under license in Russia.

Standard displacement of Mistral class assault landing ship is 16,500 tons; full displacement is 21,300 tons; dock-load displacement is 32,300 tons; length is 199 meters; beam is 32 meters; draft is 6.2 meters; full speed is 18.8 knots; cruising range is up to 19,800 miles. The ship’s air wing includes 16 helicopters (8 landing and 8 combat ones); six of them can be simultaneously placed on the flight deck.

At present, French Navy has two Mistral class landing ships in inventory and builds the third one.

Unofficially, one ship costs about EUR 600 mln.

Text: Interfax-AVN

Révolution par rapport au chiffrement symétrique : on peut se transmettre des messages chiffrés sans devoir préalablement s’échanger une clé secrète par un canal sécurisé

• conception théorique par Whitfield Diffie et Martin Hellman (1976)
• système le plus utilisé : RSA créé en 1977
• désormais utilisé partout : carte bancaire, sécurisation d’Internet, télévision cryptée, cartes d’identité électroniques…

Dans un cryptosystème asymétrique (ou cryptosystème à clés publiques), les clés existent par paires (le terme de bi-clés est également employé)

On génère une paire de clefs et on décide arbitrairement de rendre publique une des clefs, l’autre est privée.

Confidentialité : on chiffre avec la clef publique du destinataire, seul le titulaire de la clef privée associée à la clef publique peut déchiffrer.
Signature : on chiffre une empreinte du message avec la clef privée de l’émetteur. Cette empreinte peut être déchiffrée et recalculée par quiconque avec la clef publique de l’émetteur.